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UNITED STATES V. CITGO PETROLEUM CORP.:
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT “TAKES” OIL REFINERY OFF
THE HOOK FOR UNINTENTIONAL
MIGRATORY BIRD DEATHS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, an estimated 365 million to 988 million
birds die from colliding with windows annually.1 Under the current
circuit split in the United States Court of Appeals, window owners
could face potential liability in jurisdictions, such as the Second Circuit and Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, which
have adopted a strict liability interpretation of bird “takings” under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA).2 The implementation of strict liability for migratory bird deaths has divided federal
courts and left industries and commentators wondering how far liability will extend in these jurisdictions.3 As a result, window owners
may need to be wary of potential criminal prosecution.4
This Note addresses a challenge to the strict liability interpretation of the MBTA applied to migratory bird “takings.”5 In United
States v. CITGO Petroleum Corporation,6 oil giant CITGO challenged
convictions under the Clean Air Act (CAA) for erroneous jury instructions regarding the “scope of a regulation concerning ‘oilwater separators,’” in addition to convictions under the MBTA, because the district court incorrectly applied strict liability for
“takings.”7
In the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) included provisions to regulate wastewater treatment systems at oil
1. Susan Milius, Windows may kill up to 988 million birds a year in the United
States, SCIENCE NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014, 5:01 PM), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/windows-may-kill-988-million-birds-year-united-states (quantifying bird deaths
per year in United States).
2. See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir.
2015) (listing violations under strict liability); see also Current Circuit Splits, 12 SETON
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 250, 265–66 (2016) (explaining current split among federal
courts interpreting MBTA).
3. See Circuit Splits, supra note 2, at 265 (explaining federal courts’ split when
interpreting MBTA).
4. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 494 (explaining potential for
liability).
5. For a further discussion of the “takings” clause in this Note, see infra notes
5-7 and accompanying text.
6. 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
7. Id. at 479 (stating defendant’s primary challenges on appeal).

(327)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

1

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 7

328 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII: p. 327
refineries.8 In the original draft of Subpart QQQ of the CAA, the
EPA proposed regulations that governed all equipment in the wastewater treatment system, including “‘equalization basins and other
auxiliary tanks. . . .’”9 During the review process, industry commentators opposed this extensive regulation, citing “‘safety concerns’”
that could not be addressed by the industry “‘in a cost effective
manner.’”10 In response to industry feedback, the EPA made substantial changes to the final draft, including excluding equalization
tanks from the regulation.11 In CITGO Petroleum Corp., the Fifth Circuit adopted this exclusion, promoting the express meaning of the
regulation’s text to reverse the district court’s convictions, which
relied on the application of the broader intention that the CAA’s
original text contemplated.12 CITGO also challenged the district
court’s adoption of strict liability for violations of the MBTA.13 In
reversing the district court’s convictions, the Fifth Circuit joined
the Eighth Circuit and Ninth Circuit in holding that the MBTA
adopted the common law definition of “takings,” which does not
impose punishment for unintentional or negligent actions.14
This Note analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s decision in CITGO Petroleum Corp.15 Part II of this Note provides the factual and procedural
background of the CAA and MBTA convictions that led to this appeal.16 Part III provides the statutory history and an overview of
relevant case law for the CAA and MBTA.17 Part IV presents the
analysis the Fifth Circuit undertook to determine that the CAA does
not regulate equalization tanks and that the MBTA does not punish
unintentional or negligent acts.18 Part V takes a critical look at how
and why the Fifth Circuit reached its holding.19 Lastly, Part VI ana8. Id. (explaining EPA’s authority under CAA).
9. See id. at 487 (discussing CAA’s history).
10. Id. (quoting government’s explanation and changes).
11. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 486-87 (noting drafting changes of
rule under CAA).
12. See id. at 487 (explaining Subpart QQQ’s exclusions).
13. Id. at 479 (stating defendant’s primary challenges).
14. See id. at 489 (stating agreement with Eighth Circuit’s and Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of “taking”).
15. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see infra notes
98-173 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the factual background of CITGO, see infra
notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the legal background of CITGO, see infra notes
31-97 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s narrative analysis, see infra
notes 98-173 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s critical analysis, see infra
notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
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lyzes the impact of the Fifth Circuit’s holding and the divide between circuits on this issue.20
II. FACTS
In March 2002, Texas environmental inspectors subjected
CITGO Petroleum Corporation and CITGO Refining and Chemicals Company, L.P. (CITGO) to a surprise inspection, and discovered 130,000 barrels of oil floating in uncovered equalization tanks
at the Corpus Christi, Texas refinery.21 During the inspection, the
inspectors uncovered the remains of more than three dozen migratory birds.22 As a result, the inspectors cited CITGO for violations
of the CAA because such a significant quantity of oil in an equalization tank indicated that the tanks were functioning as oil-water
separators.23
Thereafter, in 2007, a Texas grand jury issued a ten-count indictment against CITGO, including five counts of unlawful “taking”
of migratory birds in violation of the MBTA and two counts of violating the CAA by “ knowingly operating [t]anks . . . as oil-water
separators without proper emission control devices. . . .”24 At a
nonjury trial, the court found CITGO guilty on both counts of the
20. For a further discussion of the decision’s impact, see infra notes 204-215
and accompanying text.
21. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir.
2015) (explaining initial inspection and CITGO’s violations).
22. Id. at 480 n.4 (listing birds found in equalization tank). “Among the bird
remains were five White Pelicans, twenty (regular old) Ducks, two Northern Shoveler Ducks, four Double Crested Cormorants, one Lesser Scaup Duck, one BlackBellied Whistling Tree Duck, one Blue-Winged Teal Duck, and one Fulvous
Whistling Tree Duck.” Id.
23. Id. at 480 (describing citation issued to CITGO following March 2002 inspection). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) instituted The Clean Air
Act as a response to health concerns related to oil refinery wastewater treatment
systems. Id. at 479. The wastewater treatment system includes:
[A] series of drains located in different parts of the refinery [that] collects the wastewater as it is generated. From there, the water travels
through lateral sewers into the first piece of equipment, aptly called an
oil-water separator. When wastewater enters the separator, oils and solids
with specific gravities less than that of water float to the top, which heavy
sludge and solids sink to the bottom. Skimmers then remove the top layer
of floating oil for recycling. . . . After wastewater passes through the oilwater separator it pools in large vessels called equalization tanks. . . .
When oil accumulates in the tanks, skimmers and vacuum trucks extract
the excess oil for recycling.
Id. at 479–80. Finally, the water goes through air flotation before undergoing biological treatment and passing through a clarifier prior to release. Id. at 480.
24. See id. (explaining procedural history of indictment). In addition to the
seven counts listed in the accompanying text, CITGO’s indictment included three
additional violations of the Clean Air Act, for which a jury exonerated CITGO at
trial. Id.
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CAA violations for the improper oil-water separators and on three
of the five counts for “taking” migratory birds.25 The convictions
resulted in a two million dollar fine for violating the CAA and “[fifteen thousand dollar fines] for each MBTA offense.”26 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court’s convictions on all counts.27 The court determined
that the equalization tanks in question did not meet the definition
of an “oil-water separator,” and the migratory birds’ deaths were
not a “taking” because the court determined negligent and unintentional behavior was not included in the definition.28 The Fifth
Circuit is the fifth federal appeals court to weigh in on the interpretation of the word “taking” in the MBTA.29 The decision joined the
Eighth Circuit’s and Ninth Circuit’s rulings, which limited the
scope of the statute to intentional acts, in contrast with the Second
Circuit’s and Tenth Circuit’s ruling, which held in favor of strict
liability for “takings,” regardless of whether the acts were
deliberate.30
III. BACKGROUND
Originally enacted on July 3, 1918, to codify treaties entered
into by the United States, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (Treaty)
states, generally, that it is “unlawful . . . by any means . . . to pursue,
hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, . . . , or kill, . . . any migratory bird. . . .”31
25. Id. at 481 (stating district court’s verdict in two-part trial). Specifically, the
proceedings included a jury trial, during which the jury found CITGO guilty of two
of the five violations of the Clean Air Act, as well as a nonjury phase, during which
the district court convicted CITGO on three of the five violations of the MBTA. Id.
26. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 481 (listing CITGO’s punishments for
five-count conviction).
27. Id. at 481 (holding harmful error required reversal of convictions).
28. Id. at 488-89 (explaining Fifth Circuit’s rationale on appeal).
29. For more information on the current split among federal courts on statutory interpretation of MBTA, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30. See Circuit Splits, supra note 2, at 265 (explaining current split among federal courts on statutory interpretation of MBTA).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2016) (explaining regulatory basis for enacting MBTA);
see also James Lockhart, Validity, Construction, and Application of Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703 to 712, and its Implementing Regulations, 3 A.L.R. FED.2D
465, 466 (2005) (annotating implementation of MBTA).
The full text of the MBTA reads:
(a) In general. Unless and except as permitted by regulations made
as hereinafter provided, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or
in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to
purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to
be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport
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The adopted uniform system of protection for migratory birds
operates as a strict liability offense and punishes violators with a
maximum fine of fifteen thousand dollars and, potentially, six
months imprisonment.32 The Treaty’s codification also delegates
discretion to the Secretary of the Interior to permit and govern certain activity under the statute.33 The MBTA earned notoriety the
United States Supreme Court validated the statute in the landmark
ruling of Missouri v. Holland.34 Justice Holmes’s opinion established
Congress’ power to legislate activities within the state previously
presumed that the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reserved for the states.35
or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for
shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any
part, next, egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or
any part, next, or egg thereof, included in the terms of the conventions
between the United States and Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916, the United States and the United
Mexican States and the Government of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment concluded March 4, 1972[,] and the convention between the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the conservation of migratory birds and their environments concluded November 19, 1976.
16 U.S.C. § 703 (2016) (emphasis in original).
32. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 707 (West 2016) (stating violations and penalties for
MBTA); see also CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 488 (describing consequences
associated with violations of MBTA).
33. See § 704 (explaining Secretary of Interior’s power under MBTA).
[T]he Secretary of Agriculture [Secretary of the Interior] is authorized
and directed, from time to time, having due regard to the zones of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, economic value, breeding
habits, and times and lines of migratory flight of such birds, to determine
when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is compatible with
the terms of the conventions to allow hunting, taking . . . and to adopt
suitable regulations permitting and governing the same, in accordance
with such determinations[.]
Id.
34. See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (upholding implementation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act against challenge of unconstitutionality). The United States Supreme Court’s holding reads:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It
can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another
power. The subject matter is only transitorily within the State and has no
permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute there soon
might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the
Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is
cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is
not sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is vain, and were it
otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to act.
We are of opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld.
Id.
35. See generally id. (explaining constitutional underpinnings of Missouri v.
Holland decision).
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Since its Supreme Court validation in 1920, many court decisions have helped interpret the meaning of the statute’s text.36 As
early as two decades before the MBTA’s enactment, the debate over
“taking” migratory birds came before the United States Supreme
Court.37 In Geer v. Connecticut,38 the court convicted the defendant
of unlawful intent to transport birds out of the state in violation of a
Connecticut statute prohibiting such conduct.39 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions under the United States
Constitution, citing the lawful regulation of killing, transporting,
and taking birds.40 The Geer court applied the common law meaning of “take” to wildlife: to “‘reduce those animals, by killing or
capturing, to human control.’”41 Essential to that interpretation is
the principle that “absent contrary indications, it is presumed that
Congress intended to adopt the common law definition. . . .”42
In United States v. FMC Corporation,43 a challenge of a MBTA
conviction reached the United States Court of Appeals.44 In 1977,
the Second Circuit heard appeals of eighteen United States District
Court for the Western District of New York convictions for killing
migratory birds based on the corporation’s lack of intent to kill
birds.45 The prosecution indicted FMC Corporation on thirty-six
counts of violating the MBTA for killing ninety-two migratory birds
“‘by means of toxic and noxious waters. . . .’”46 On appeal, FMC
Corporation argued that the killing of migratory birds must be an
affirmative action or done with the intent to harm birds to sustain a
36. See Monica Carusello, Can An Oil Pit Take A Bird? Why Migratory Bird Treaty
Act Should Apply To Inadvertent Takings And Killings By Oil Pits, 31 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 87, 89-92 (2015) (noting key statutory interpretations of MBTA).
37. See generally Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 521 (1896) (describing
background of case on appeal to United States Supreme Court).
38. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
39. Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 521-22 (1896) (stating history of
charges during appeal process).
40. See id. at 534-35 (explaining Supreme Court’s holding in favor of
Connecticut).
41. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 489 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995)) (discussing precedent Geer set).
42. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994) (determining that common law definition should apply to terms in statutes unless otherwise text of statute
makes clear).
43. 572 F.2d 902 (2d. Cir. 1978).
44. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 902 (2d. Cir. 1978) (providing
background on appeal for FMC Corporation).
45. See id. at 903 (providing background on appeal for FMC Corporation).
46. Id. (describing reasoning for indictment, which led to eighteen-count
conviction that was appealed to Second Circuit).
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conviction.47 In affirming the convictions, the Second Circuit
noted that FMC Corporation was not intentional in its actions, but
instead, it was aware that the toxins were dangerous to humans.48
Specifically, in its manufacturing process, FMC Corporation allowed these highly toxic chemicals to escape into a pond, which
effectively killed the migratory birds.49 Importantly, the court
noted that while the statute was void of any scienter language,
“[i]mposing strict liability on FMC in this case does not dictate that
every death of a bird will result in imposing strict criminal liability
on some party.”50
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans51
established a divide between United States Court of Appeals’ circuits.52 The Ninth Circuit made an important determination on
the word “taking” in the MBTA in a consolidated appeal from decisions of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington and the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon that enjoined logging until protection for the northern
spotted owl could be put into effect.53 The Ninth Circuit determined that ambiguous terms in the MBTA, like “take” and “kill,”
which do not specify a mens rea requirement, refer to “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct
which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918.”54
The Eighth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
“taking” six years later in its opinion in Newton County Wildlife Association v. United States Forest Service.55 The Eighth Circuit heard the
case after the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas denied Newton County Wildlife Association’s, the Sierra
Club’s, and other individuals’ motions to enjoin the United States
47. See id. at 906 (recounting Defendant’s basis for appeal).
48. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 908 (noting awareness of dangers as reasoning in
affirming convictions).
49. See id. at 908 (explaining Second Circuit’s reasoning in affirming
convictions).
50. Id. at 908 (making important distinction between universal strict liability
for MBTA violations and case-by-case analysis).
51. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
52. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding “take” within MBTA does not include unintentional actions).
53. Id. at 302-03 (analyzing use of word “taking” in MBTA text).
54. Id. at 302 (stating court’s interpretation of “taking”); see also Newton Cnty.
Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (restating Ninth Circuit’s conclusion).
55. See Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at 115 (agreeing with Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Seattle Audubon Soc’y).
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Forest Service from making sales of timber in the Ozark National
Forest.56 The plaintiffs argued on appeal that logging resulting
from the timber sales would have a significantly negative, and possibly lethal, effect on migratory birds nesting in the forest.57 The
court explicitly stated, “[I]t would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal
prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of migratory birds.”58 In its opinion, the Eighth
Circuit explicitly endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
“taking” from Seattle Audubon Society.59
The same year the Eighth Circuit decided Newton County Wildlife Ass’n, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Corrow,60 ruled that “[a]lthough we have not previously so held, we
now join those Circuits which hold misdemeanor violations under
[Section] 703 [MBTA] are strict liability crimes.”61 The facts of Corrow were unique in that the defendant was charged with selling
feathers of migratory birds protected under MBTA.62 In rejecting
the use of a scienter requirement for the MBTA, the court noted,
“‘[I]t is not necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with specific intent or guilty knowledge.’”63
The Tenth Circuit affirmed this interpretation in United States
v. Apollo Energies, Inc.,64 stating that the holding in Corrow prevented
the appellant’s argument that MBTA required an element of intent.65 The Apollo Energies court elaborated on the interpretation
principle that “‘[l]ike other regulatory acts where the penalties are
small and there is ‘no grave harm to an offender’s reputation,’ the
56. See id. at 114 (stating procedural history prior to appeal).
57. Id. at 115 (noting plaintiffs’ argument on appeal for enjoining United
States Forest Services from making timber sales).
58. Id. (emphasis in original) (reasoning that strict liability goes beyond legislators’ intent when Congress passed MBTA).
59. See id. (noting agreement between circuit courts). The court stated, “[W]e
agree with the Ninth Circuit that the ambiguous terms ‘take’ and ‘kill’ in 16 U.S.C.
§ 703 mean ‘physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers,
conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment
in 1918.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
60. 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997).
61. United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding appellants strictly liable for MBTA violations).
62. See id. at 799 (citation omitted) (explaining count two of charges against
defendant).
63. Id. at 805 (quoting United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 341, 435 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1986)) (stating proposition that MBTA violations are strict liability).
64. 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
65. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 684 (10th Cir. 2010)
(explaining how Corrow specifically addressed mens rea requirement for MBTA).
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Supreme Court has long recognized a different standard applies to
those federal criminal statutes that are essentially regulatory.”66
Plainly stated, the Tenth Circuit’s stance is that “[a]s a matter of
statutory construction, the ‘take’ provision of the Act does not contain a scienter requirement.”67
In 2002, the Fifth Circuit addressed the scienter requirement
of the MBTA on appeal from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana in United States v. Morgan.68 The
defendant appealed his conviction for a violation of the MBTA, arguing that it was not a strict liability offense and that he did not
intend to surpass the daily bag limit while hunting.69 After consulting precedent from other circuits and congressional intent, as well
as reviewing the type of offense, the Fifth Circuit held that the possession of migratory birds in excess of the daily bag limit was a strict
liability offense and, therefore, affirmed the convictions.70
One of the more extensive discussions of statutory interpretation for the “taking” clause of the MBTA came from the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado in United States v.
Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc.71 Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc. involved
the defendant’s motion to dismiss charges for violations of the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act and the MBTA for the death of
seventeen birds that landed on the defendant’s electrical power
lines.72 The defendant argued that the unintentional electrocution
of a bird could not constitute a violation of the MBTA or the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act.73
The defendant did not contest the Department of Interior’s
definition of “take”; the court, therefore, adopted the Department’s
66. Id. (citation omitted) (explaining Supreme Court precedent for strict liability interpretation).
67. Id. at 686 (stating Apollo Energies court’s adherence to Corrow decision).
The court stated, “[ ]We are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en
banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme
Court.[ ]” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Smith, 10 F.3d
723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993)).
68. See United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 612–13 (5th Cir. 2002)
(describing procedural history of case).
69. See id. at 612-13 (elaborating on factual background of convictions).
70. Id. at 616 (explaining various interpretations court consulted in reaching
conclusion in favor of upholding convictions).
71. See generally United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d
1070 (D. Colo. 1999) (analyzing “taking” as it pertains to use in other statutes,
including Endangered Species Act).
72. See id. at 1071 (providing factual and procedural background to statutory
discussion).
73. See id. at 1072 (discussing defendant’s argument in motion to court).
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interpretation of the MBTA.74 The court looked to the statute’s
language for meaning, and concluded that “‘[t]ake’ is defined as to
‘pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.’”75
Next, the court addressed whether the MBTA only regulated intentional conduct, to which it cited Corrow for the proposition that violations of the MBTA constitute strict liability and do not require a
finding of specific intent or criminal knowledge.76 Finally, the
court examined whether the MBTA was intended to regulate only
the physical conduct typically associated with hunters and
poachers.77 In its analysis, the court found that the text of the statute not only included terms like hunting, capturing, shooting, and
trapping, which directly identify with hunting and poaching; but, it
also included terms, such as “pursuing, killing, wounding, collecting, possessing, offering for sale, selling, offering to barter, bartering, offering to purchase, purchasing, delivering for
transportation, transporting, [and] carrying.”78 The court elected
not to limit the scope of the statute to those that were acting as
hunters and poachers, and opined that “in drafting the MBTA,
Congress did not include any language that would suggest it intended to punish only those who act with specific motives.”79
While the MBTA’s statutory interpretation question has not
reached the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has
reviewed analogous language in the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA).80 The text of the ESA states, “‘Except as provided in
sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title . . . it is unlawful for any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . take
any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of
the United States.’”81
74. See id. (explaining defendant’s failure to object to Department of Interior’s definition of “take”). The court stated, “Accordingly, I defer to the Department of Interior’s definition of ‘take’ as a reasonable interpretation of the MBTA’s
plain language.” Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 1073 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1997)).
76. See Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (explaining district
court’s use of Corrow for determining mens rea requirement).
77. See id. at 1074-75 (noting defendant’s argument that only hunting and
poaching conduct is prohibited). “Moon Lake next argue[d] that the Acts prohibit only physical conduct normally exhibited by hunters or poachers.” Id.
78. Id. at 1074 (contrasting words in statute directly associated with hunting
and poaching and words that can be achieved without hunting or poaching).
79. Id. at 1075 (stating court’s refusal to limit scope of MBTA to hunters and
poachers).
80. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 690 (1995) (analyzing use of “take” in text of Endangered Species Act); see also
16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2016) (codifying Endangered Species Act of 1973).
81. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 690-91 (providing text of statute under review).
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The ESA defines “take” as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage
in any such conduct.”82 Furthermore, it is the late Justice Antonin
Scalia’s dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for a
Great Oregon83 that provides the most informative discussion of
“take.”84 In his dissent, Justice Scalia notes, “I, too, think it would
not violate the Act . . . but for the textual reason that only action
directed at living animals constitutes a ‘take.’”85
In addition to historical precedent, the Fifth Circuit’s development of a standard of review and statutory interpretation principles
proved vital to the outcome of this case.86 In determining the standard of review on appeal for jury instructions, the Fifth Circuit indicated, in its decision in United States v. Williams,87 that the district
court has significant discretion in describing the law to the jury.88
Under this standard, the court examined only whether the district
court provided a “correct statement of the law and whether it
clearly instructed the jurors as to the principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.”89 Consequently, judicial review of jury instructions has been limited to an examination
for abuse of discretion.90
The court was also limited by its adopted statutory interpretation principles, such as using the same rules of construction for in-

82. Id. at 691 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)) (defining word “take” as used in
ESA).
83. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
84. See id. at 735 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting Justice Scalia’s textual analysis). “[O]nly action directed at living animals constitutes a ‘take.’ ” Id.
85. Id. (explaining disagreement with majority based on statutory analysis of
“take”).
86. See KCMC, Inc. v. FCC, 600 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining Fifth
Circuit statutory interpretation rules of construction); see also Shabani, 513 U.S. at
13 (noting presumption of common law definition). “[A]bsent contrary indications, it is presumed that Congress intended to adopt the common law definition. . . .” Id.; see, e.g. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (giving
effect to all provisions of statute).
87. 610 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 2010).
88. United States v. Williams, 610 F.3d 271, 285 (5th Cir. 2010) (reviewing
jury instructions for abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Santos, 589 F.3d
759, 764 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Orji-Nwosu, 549 F.3d 1005, 1008
(5th Cir. 2008)).
89. Orji-Nwosu, 549 F.3d at 1008 (quoting United States v. Young, 282 F.3d
349, 353 (5th Cir. 2002)) (stating court’s standard of review).
90. See Santos, 589 F.3d at 764 (explaining appellate standard of review for
jury instructions).
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terpreting regulations or statutes.91 Of note, the Fifth Circuit
determined in United States v. Clark92 that a “statute must be strictly
construed and ‘cannot be enlarged by analogy or expanded beyond
the plain meaning of the words used.’”93 The Fifth Circuit took
this principle a step further in Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm’n94 by establishing the precedent that
a regulation, which subjects a private party to civil or criminal sanctions, must be narrowly construed to the expressed meaning of the
regulation.95
To date, there is no consensus on interpreting and enforcing
the MBTA.96 Ultimately, when CITGO Petroleum Corp. reached the
Fifth Circuit on appeal, the court had to consider different holdings from four circuits that implicated multiple interpretations of
the text of the regulation.97
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In CITGO Petroleum Corp., the Fifth Circuit focused on two issues: (1) the CAA convictions for equalization tanks functioning as
an oil-water separator, and (2) the MBTA convictions for “takings.”98 To address the CAA convictions, the court focused on the
express text of Subpart QQQ of the CAA, as well as the promulgation history of the section.99 In reviewing the MBTA convictions,
the court analyzed the text of the regulation, significant case law

91. See KCMC, Inc., 600 F.2d at 549 (noting interpretation rules are same for
regulations and statutes). “[I]n constructing a regulation, we must employ the
rules of construction generally applicable to statutes.” Id.
92. 412 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1969).
93. Id. at 890 (quoting Chappell v. United States, 270 F.2d 274, 278 (9th Cir.
1959)) (noting standard for statutory interpretation).
94. 528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1976).
95. See id. at 649 (explaining use of express meaning rather than intended
meaning of regulating agency). “If a violation of a regulation subjects private parties to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation cannot be construed to mean what
an agency intended but did not adequately express.” Id. (citing Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 488 F.2d 337, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1973)).
96. For a further explanation of the current split among federal courts on
statutory interpretation of MBTA, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
97. See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 491-93 (5th
Cir. 2015) (analyzing previous decisions from Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits).
98. Id. at 479 (stating defendant’s primary challenges on appeal).
99. For a further discussion of the Court’s analysis of Subpart QQQ, see infra
notes 101-124 and accompanying text.
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from sister jurisdictions, and the district court’s opinion in this
case.100
A. Oil-Water Separator
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis with CITGO’s challenge to
the CAA conviction, alleging that the equalization tank operated as
an oil-water separator.101 The issue centered on the trial court’s
instructions to the jury, which presented the “definition of an oilwater separator, but then added: ‘[t]he definition of oil-water
separator does not require that [it] have any or all of the ancillary
equipment mentioned. . . . An oil-water separator is defined by how
it is used.’”102 In contrast, Subpart QQQ’s definition of an oil-water
separator combines both an analysis of how the tank is used and the
necessary components that make up the separator.103 Despite the
court providing the jury with the exact text of Subpart QQQ, the
jury instructions influenced the verdict, requiring reversal for harmful error on the CAA convictions.104
The Fifth Circuit embarked on an analysis of regulatory interpretation after reaching its conclusion that the jury instructions
misinterpreted the proper meaning of CAA Subpart QQQ.105 Establishing a framework for regulatory interpretation, the court relied on the same interpretation principles for regulations as it does
for statutes.106 Using this structure, the court examined the plain
text of the regulation.107 The court specifically noted that regulations with criminal penalties must be examined narrowly without
being enlarged beyond the commonly understood meanings of the
words.108 The regulation, therefore, should be strictly analyzed
100. For a further discussion of the Court’s analysis of MBTA, see infra notes
125-173 and accompanying text.
101. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 481 (describing first issue on appeal).
102. Id. (noting defendant’s contention on appeal from decision) (citing
United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., No. C-06-563, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32004, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011)).
103. Id. (stating Subpart QQQ definition of oil-water separator).
104. See id. (reversing convictions because of harmful error in jury
instructions).
105. See id. at 482 (explaining court’s interpretive framework for statutes).
106. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 482 (explaining interpretation of
regulations has same framework as statutes). “This court applies the same interpretive framework to regulations as to statutes.” Id. (citing KCMC, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
600 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 1979)).
107. See id. (indicating court’s analysis framework).
108. Id. (describing importance of applying express meaning of regulation).
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based on the expressed terms of the regulation, rather than the
agency’s intended meaning.109
The issue centered on the regulation’s definition of an oilwater separator, which listed specific parts that comprise the oilwater separator.110 The definition unquestionably covered oil-water
separators at CITGO’s refinery, but it was unclear whether the language encompassed other equipment functioning similar to an oilwater separator, specifically, the equalization tank in this controversy.111 In its analysis, the court simplified the test to two elements: (1) the equipment must functionally separate oil from
water, and (2) the equipment must be comprised of specific
parts.112 Constitutional avoidance, moreover, prevented interpreting the definition from including equipment lacking some of the
listed parts.113
Pursuant to these interpretation principles, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the equalization tanks in question, despite having
skimmers, were lacking “weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers.”114 As a result, the tanks did not qualify as oil-water separators
under Subpart QQQ, and, therefore, CITGO did not violate the
CAA.115 The court’s analysis further noted that Subpart Kb gov109. See id. (quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Com., 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976)) (establishing standard for interpretation of statute).
110. See id. (describing 40 C.F.R. § 60.691).
An oil-water separator . . . is wastewater treatment equipment[ ] used to
separate oil from water consisting of a separation tank, which also includes the forebay and other separator basins, skimmers, weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers. Slop oil facilities, including tanks, are included
in this term along with storage vessels and auxiliary equipment located
between individual drain systems and the oil-water separator. This term
does not include storage vessels or auxiliary equipment[,] which do not
come in contact with or store oily wastewater.
Id.
111. See id. at 483 (reframing issue to whether express text of regulation encompasses equipment other than oil-water separators or equipment functioning
similarly).
112. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 483 (stating two requirements under
Subpart QQQ definition of oil-water separator). “Obviously, the equipment covered by Subpart QQQ must be ‘used to separate oil from water.’ Second and more
critically, the equipment ‘consist[s] of’ certain parts—that is, an oil-water separator
is ‘composed or made up of’ particular things.” Id. (citation omitted).
113. See id. at 484 n.6 (noting constitutional avoidance requires courts to
avoid interpretations that “engender[ ] constitutional issues if [ ] reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question”).
114. Id. at 483 (stating equalization tanks could not be considered oil-water
separators).
115. Id. (holding CITGO could not be found guilty of violating Subpart QQQ
because Tanks 116 and 117 do not fall within definition of oil-water separator).
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erned storage vessels involved in the water treatment system, such
as CITGO’s refinery equalization tanks.116
To foreclose the government’s argument that Subpart QQQ
included equalization tanks, the court analyzed the promulgation
history.117 The EPA found it “‘environmentally prudent’” to regulate all parts of the wastewater treatment system in the original promulgation.118 In response to the proposed regulations, several
refinery operators, including CITGO, and many commentators, objected to the proposed regulation that covered equalization tanks
and air flotation systems due to cost and safety concerns.119 Commentators suggested that placing roofs on equalization tanks and
air flotation systems would actually increase the risk of explosions
and fires, as well as impair the efficiency of the wastewater treatment system.120
In light of the industry comments, the EPA made significant
changes to Subpart QQQ as part of their reevaluation.121 In the
Background for Promulgated Standards, the agency noted that the
industry concerns about safety could not be overcome in a cost-effective manner.122 Subsequently, air flotation systems, “‘equalization basins[,] and other . . . equipment between the oil-water
separator and air flotation system’” are excluded from the final regulation.123 The court ultimately held that “history points to the
same conclusions as Subpart QQQ’s text: Subpart QQQ governs oilwater separators but not equalization tanks.”124

116. Id. at 485 (explaining Subpart Kb, 40 C.F.R. § 60.110b(a), controls).
117. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 486 (examining promulgation history based on considerable time parties spent analyzing it in support of respective
conclusions).
118. Id. (noting need to regulate all emissions points “ ‘from which VOC vapors might be emitted’ ”).
119. Id. (providing background on comments to originally proposed
regulation).
120. See id. at 486-87 (explaining substantial safety risks associated with proposed regulation).
121. See id. at 487 (describing substantial revision to regulation based on industry comments).
122. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 487 (noting industry could not overcome safety and cost concerns).
123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1997)) (stating exclusion of equalization tanks from final
promulgated regulation due to safety and cost concerns).
124. Id. (holding promulgation history affirms earlier analysis of regulation’s
text).
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B. Migratory Bird Treaty Act
Next, the court faced the task of deciding whether to reverse or
affirm CITGO’s convictions under MBTA.125 The discussion began
with the history of the MBTA, namely, the adoption of the MBTA to
implement the Preservation of Migratory Birds Treaty that the
United States and the United Kingdom created, acting on behalf of
Canada.126 The court began its analysis with the conclusions of the
trial court.127
In delivering its opinion, the district court reached three notable conclusions.128 First, the district court concluded that “an illegal ‘taking’ is an ambiguous term that involves more activities than
those related to hunting, poaching[,] and intentional acts against
migratory birds.”129 Subsequently, the court concluded that under
the MBTA, only proximate causation of a “taking” was necessary to
satisfy strict liability.130 Finally, the district court concluded that
CITGO’s violation of the regulations were enough to sustain the
company’s misdemeanor convictions.131 Buoyed by the regulation’s text, analysis of similar regulations and statutes, its understanding of relevant case law, and the critique of the district court’s
reasoning, the Fifth Circuit held that “a ‘taking’ is limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds[;]” the
court, therefore, overturned CITGO’s MBTA convictions.132
1. Text of Regulation
CITGO’s conviction arose from “taking” migratory birds, and
as a result, the Fifth Circuit confined its interpretation to that specific term.133 The court took the stance that Congress adopted the
125. See id. at 488 (describing second issue analyzed on appeal).
126. See id. (explaining adoption of MBTA in 1918 based on international
treaty desiring preservation of migratory birds).
127. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 488 (stating district court’s
holding).
128. See id. (noting district court’s canvassing of case law, drawing three “significant” conclusions).
129. Id. at 488 (citing United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.
2d 841, 843–45 (S.D. Tex. 2012)) (describing district court’s first major
conclusion).
130. Id. (describing district court’s second major conclusion).
131. Id. (describing district court’s third major conclusion).
132. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 488-89 (reversing convictions based
on variety of sources).
133. See id. at 489 (noting court’s decision to confine discussion to “take”). In
dicta, however, the court endorsed a similar interpretation of the word “kill,” limiting its interpretation to intentional acts. See id. at 489 n.10.
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common law definition of “take” in promulgating the MBTA.134 As
it applies to migratory birds and wildlife in general, the term “take”
is defined as “reduc[ing] those animals, by killing or capturing, to
human control.”135 Furthermore, at the time the MBTA passed,
“take” was a well-defined, unambiguous term of art.136 In its interpretation, the court concluded that an affirmative act, which could
not happen by accident or omission, was required to reduce an
animal to human control.137
2. Similar Regulations and Statutes
The court examined statutes enacted more than fifty years after the MBTA to demonstrate Congress’ ability to expand “take”
beyond the common law definition when necessary, thus affirming
the notion that the MBTA was meant to be interpreted under the
common law definition.138 First, the court examined the ESA,
which includes the term “take”; unlike the MBTA, however, the
ESA includes an express definition for “take,” encompassing the following acts: “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”139
The terms “harass” and “harm” serve to include unintentional acts
or omissions under the common law definition.140 In including
“harass” and “harm” in its definition, Congress made a deliberate
decision to include actions or omissions broader than those encompassed by the common law definition.141
Next, the court examined the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA).142 In the MMPA, Congress included the term “harass” in
134. See id. at 489 (stating court’s presumption in favor of adopting common
law definition).
135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995)) (defining “take”
under common law).
136. See id. (explaining meaning of “take” when MBTA was passed in 1918).
137. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 489 (providing previous Supreme
Court interpretations of “take”).
138. See id. at 490 (explaining later enacted statutes expressly included accidental or indirect harm to animals).
139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)) (defining “take” in ESA).
140. See id. (explaining Congress’ deliberate modification of “take” common
law definition in ESA).
141. See id. (explaining expanded of definition of “take” in ESA); see also Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 707 (approving expanded reading of “take”).
142. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 490 (analyzing “take” as defined in
MMPA).
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its definition of “take.”143 The court noted this affirmative choice
represents legislative intent to include not just intentional acts, but
also those affecting marine mammals through negligence or indirect acts or omissions.144 As a result of the analysis of the ESA and
the MMPA, the court concluded that Congress knew when to expressly include unintentional or negligent behavior in its statutes,
and its failure to include the terminology of “harm” or “harass” in
the MBTA was an intentional choice to adopt the common law
definition.145
3. Sister Jurisdiction Case Law
After finalizing its conclusion based on the regulation’s text,
the court embarked on an analysis of relevant case law from sister
jurisdictions.146 The Second Circuit, in its holding in FMC Corporation, read the MBTA broadly to impose strict liability, punishing accidental and indirect acts.147 The court explained that the Second
Circuit reached its decision by balancing the intent of the MBTA
against “‘a reluctance to charge anyone with a crime which he does
not know he is committing. . . .’”148 Ultimately, the Second Circuit
reasoned that the expanded liability its reading of the statute created could be alleviated by “sound prosecutorial discretion,” thus
holding violations of the MBTA are strict liability offenses.149
The court then addressed the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Apollo
Energies and employed similar reasoning to the Second Circuit.150
In rejecting the defendant’s arguments against imposing strict liability for violation of the MBTA, the Tenth Circuit concluded that it
was “obvious” that the MBTA applied to “‘activities beyond purposeful hunting or possession of migratory birds.’”151 The Apollo
143. See id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. §1362(13)) (explaining Congress’ choice to
include “harass” in definition of “take” in MMPA).
144. Id. (stating negligent acts that indirectly disturb marine mammals are
encompassed in “harass”).
145. Id. at 490-91 (discussing Congress’ intentional choice to not include
modifying terms in MBTA). “Harm and harass are the terms Congress uses when
it wishes to include negligent and unintentional acts within the definition of ‘take.’
Without these words, ‘take’ assumes its common law definition.” Id. at 491.
146. See generally id. at 491-93 (analyzing decisions from Second, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits).
147. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 491-92 (explaining Second Circuit’s reading of MBTA).
148. Id. at 492 (explaining Second Circuit’s balancing test in FMC Corp.).
149. Id. (describing Second Circuit’s holding).
150. See id. (analyzing Tenth Circuit’s decision in Apollo Energies).
151. Id. (citation omitted) (describing Tenth Circuit’s reasoning for rejecting
defendant’s arguments).
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Energies court also held that the MBTA was not unconstitutionally
vague.152 The court rejected the Second Circuit’s and Tenth Circuit’s broad reading in favor of the express meaning of the regulation’s text.153 The court explained that, at the most fundamental
level, these decisions “confuse the mens rea and the actus reus requirements.”154 For example, the court noted that by not requiring
an affirmative action, the Second Circuit and Tenth Circuit potentially impose liability on “[a] person whose car accidentally collided
with the bird. . . .”155 Thus, the Fifth Circuit determined that the
action, “to take,” even without strict liability, is something that must
be done “knowingly” or “voluntarily.”156 In rejecting the other circuits’ conclusions, the court went a step further and suggested that
the Second Circuit’s and Tenth Circuit’s outcomes may have been
different if the defendants’ lawyers made the proper arguments
about the common law definition of “take” in the MBTA.157
4. District Court Decision
In its decision, the district court elected to follow the Tenth
Circuit’s precedent that a “taking” can be involuntary, noting that it
was “‘obvious’ that ‘unprotected oil field equipment can take or kill
migratory birds.’”158 Further, the district court applied the Tenth
Circuit’s “proximate cause requirement” to find “that the birds’
deaths were directly, foreseeably caused by the lack of roofing on
Tanks 116 and 117.”159 The district court distinguished this case
from other MBTA oil field equipment cases because, in this case,
CITGO’s tanks were uncovered, and thus, in violation of the CAA
and Texas state law.160
152. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 492 (describing Tenth Circuit’s
reasoning for rejecting defendant’s arguments).
153. See id. (declining to adopt Second Circuit’s and Tenth Circuit’s strict
liability interpretation of Second Circuit and Tenth Circuit).
154. Id. (explaining court’s fundamental disagreement with sister jurisdictions’ holdings).
155. Id. at 493 (providing example that not requiring affirmative act creates
inappropriate liability).
156. Id. at 492 (noting actus reus, rather than mens rea, requires affirmative
act).
157. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 492 (describing court’s admonishment for defendants’ attorneys failing to argue meaning of “take”).
158. Id. at 493 (explaining district court’s agreement with Tenth Circuit).
159. Id. (citation omitted) (applying proximate cause to migratory bird
“takings”).
160. See id. (noting difference between present case and others because of
additional CAA violation). “The court distinguished its result from other district
court cases that dismissed similar MBTA indictments arising from oil field opera-
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In reversing and remanding the case with instructions, the
Fifth Circuit noted two major flaws in the district court’s reasoning:
(1) the district court’s conclusion that migratory bird deaths should
be criminalized when they result from violations of federal or state
laws is not supported by any textual basis; and (2) CITGO was not
in violation of the CAA.161 In basing its MBTA decision on alleged
violations of federal or state law, overturning the CAA conviction
itself necessitated overturning the MBTA conviction.162 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit held that “even under the district court’s erroneous
legal interpretation, the MBTA convictions must be overturned.”163
In a final point of support for its holding, the Fifth Circuit
looked at the application of the strict liability interpretation.164 Notably, the court alluded to the unrealistic enforcement of strict liability in a variety of scenarios.165 For instance, anywhere between
ninety-seven million and 976 million birds perish each year by running into windows.166 Cars kill an additional sixty million birds
each year.167 Additionally, while nationwide statistics are not available, in the state of Wisconsin, domestic cats kill thirty-nine million
birds each year.168 Under the logic promulgated by the jurisdictions that hold defendants liable for all acts, direct or indirect, with
proximate cause, “all owners of big windows, communication towers, wind turbines, solar energy farms, cars, cats, and even church
steeples may be found guilty of violating the MBTA.”169
In rejecting this approach, the court noted that the only protection afforded to “violators” under the proposed system was
tions because CITGO left Tanks 116 and 117 uncovered in violation of the Clean
Air Act and Texas law.” Id.
161. Id. (pointing out district court’s major flaws in opinion).
162. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 493 (explaining how district
court’s MBTA conviction reliant on CAA conviction).
163. Id. (holding flawed reasoning required overturning of district court’s
opinion).
164. See id. at 493-94 (applying strict liability interpretation, which Second Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and district court endorsed to determine potential for overly
expansive scope of Act).
165. See id. at 494 (explaining significant number of accidental migratory bird
deaths each year that could be prosecuted under strict liability interpretation of
MBTA).
166. Id. at 493–94 (citing U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service statistics on deaths of
birds that run into windows).
167. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 493–94 (citing statistics from U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service on vehicular-caused bird deaths).
168. Id. (citing U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service statistics on bird deaths from
cats).
169. Id. (suggesting strict liability takes MBTA to such broad extremes as to be
unreasonable).
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prosecutorial discretion, which is an insufficient barrier to prevent
severe penalties of up to fifteen thousand dollars or six months in
prison, or both for unintentional violators.170 The irrational consequences of a strict liability interpretation provided the final notch
of support for the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the MBTA does not
punish unintentional acts or omissions.171 After this analysis, the
Fifth Circuit held that, “Subpart QQQ only regulates equipment
conventionally, not merely functionally, known as oil-water
separators . . .”172 As such, the court reversed the convictions and
remanded the case to the district court “with instructions to enter a
judgment of acquittal. . . .”173
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The court in CITGO Petroleum Corp. held that CITGO did not
violate the CAA because CITGO’s equalization tanks did not constitute an oil-water separator.174 In addition, CITGO did not violate
the MBTA because unintentional or negligent acts are not considered “takings.”175 The court based these rulings on an in-depth
statutory analysis and review of relevant case law.176 Section I of the
court’s opinion discussed the court’s finding of reversible error
with the jury instructions in regard to the CAA.177 Section II of the
court’s opinion concluded that the MBTA’s ban on “takings” is directed at intentional acts rather than unintentional or negligent
actions.178
170. Id. (rebuking idea of prosecutorial discretion as protection to indirect
violations of MBTA).
171. See id. (stating absurd results further support interpretation that Congress intended common law definition of “take”).
172. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 494 (restating Court’s reasoning for
reversing and remanding with instructions). The court’s holding states:
Subpart QQQ only regulates equipment conventionally, not merely functionally, known as oil-water separators. . . . Equalization Tanks 116 and
117 at CITGO’s Corpus Christi refinery are outside the regulatory definition and thus are not “oil-water separators” . . . the MBTA’s ban on “takings” only prohibits intentional acts (not omissions) that directly (not
indirectly or accidentally) kill migratory birds.
Id.
173. Id. (holding in favor of acquittal on Counts Four, Five, Eight, Nine, and
Ten).
174. Id. (reversing district court’s conviction).
175. See id. (reversing district court’s conviction).
176. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 125-173 and accompanying text.
177. For a further discussion on the CAA convictions, see supra notes 101-124
and accompanying text.
178. For a further discussion on the MBTA convictions, see supra notes 125173 and accompanying text.
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A. What Is An Oil-Water Separator?
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, in Section I, determined whether
jury instructions given at trial properly defined an oil-water
separator.179 In essence, the question was simply the definition of
an oil-water separator.180 In its analysis, the court began with the
text of the regulation at issue, Subpart QQQ of the CAA.181 Addressing the plain text of the regulation, the court held that the
regulation requires two elements: (1) the equipment must functionally separate oil from water; and (2) the equipment must be
comprised of particular parts.182 In doing so, the court took the
interpretation a step further, employing the principle of constitutional avoidance to determine that any equipment not comprised
of all the parts listed could not be considered an oil-water
separator.183 The court found that the district court’s description
of an oil-water separator, based solely on the function, rather than
components, did not comport with the text of Subpart QQQ of the
CAA.184 This ruling allowed the court to determine that CITGO’s
equalization tanks, which lacked necessary parts, such as grit chambers, sludge hoppers, and weirs, did not qualify as oil-water
separators and thus, CITGO could not be punished under the
CAA.185
The Fifth Circuit elected to continue its analysis with the promulgation history of the CAA and Subpart QQQ.186 The court’s
revelation that the EPA made significant drafting changes to Subpart QQQ in response to comments from several refinery operators
shed new light on the intended meaning of the regulation.187 The
EPA originally intended a broad-sweeping regulation that encom179. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 481 (stating court’s first issue on
appeal).
180. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 101-124 and accompanying text.
181. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis, see supra notes 101-124
and accompanying text.
182. For a further discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s application of oil-water
separator, see supra notes 110–116 and accompanying text.
183. For a further discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s constitutional avoidance,
see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
184. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 481 (explaining why jury instructions
were inadequate).
185. Id. at 483 (holding CITGO could not be found guilty of violating Subpart QQQ because Tanks 116 and 117 do not fall within definition of oil-water
separator).
186. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 101-124 and accompanying text.
187. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
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passed all parts of the wastewater treatment system.188 Responding
to the industry’s comments to the original Subpart QQQ text, the
EPA noted that equalizations tanks, as well as other auxiliary tanks,
basins, and equipment that function between the oil-water
separator and the air flotation system, were excluded from the final
regulation.189 Thus, the Court’s holding that CITGO could not be
held liable for CAA violations for its equalization tanks was consistent both in its statutory interpretation and the promulgation
history.190
B. What If It Was Not Intentional?
In Section II, the Fifth Circuit faced a much more convoluted
analysis based on the breadth of the case law on the MBTA and the
lack of consensus among the jurisdictions.191 Facing case law from
four other circuits, the Fifth Circuit had to distinguish its holding
from the Second and Tenth Circuits through facts and law.192 The
court began its analysis of case law by reviewing the district court’s
decision.193 The district court reached two conclusions in regard to
the MBTA convictions: (1)”taking” is “an ambiguous term that involves more activities than those related to hunting, poaching and
intentional acts against migratory birds[,]” and (2) only proximate
cause is required for strict liability.194 It is important to note that
MBTA includes the word “kill” in its definition, but the Fifth Circuit
focused solely on the word “take” because it was the term used in
CITGO’s original indictment.195 In reaching these conclusions, the
district court noted it was obvious that unintentional deaths of mi188. For a further discussion of the original intention of the regulation, see
supra note 118 and accompanying text.
189. For a further discussion on the changes to the regulation after industry
comments, see supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
190. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 101-124 and accompanying text.
191. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 125-173 and accompanying text.
192. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 146-157 and accompanying text.
193. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 488 (reviewing district court’s
convictions).
194. Id. (stating district court’s two MBTA conclusions). Additionally, for a
further discussion of district court’s conclusions, see supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text
195. Alexander Obrecht, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Question Of Unintentional
“Take” Primed For Potential Fifth Circuit En Banc Or Supreme Court Review, BAKERHOSTETLER (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/migratory-bird-treatyact-question-of-42665/ (explaining Fifth Circuit’s focus on “take” instead of “kill”).
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gratory birds from oil field equipment were “takings.”196 To reverse
the convictions, the Fifth Circuit anchored its holding in the decisions of the Eighth Circuit and Ninth Circuit that “takings” punish
only intentional actions.197
To join the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit needed
to effectively distinguish this case from the Second Circuit’s holding
in FMC Corp. and the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Apollo Energies,
Inc.198 In response to the sister jurisdiction precedent, which the
district court found persuasive, the CITGO Petroleum Corp. court refused “to adopt the broad, counter-textual reading of the MBTA by
these circuits.”199 To explain its reasoning, the Fifth Circuit stated,
“More fundamentally, we disagree that because misdemeanor
MBTA violations are strict liability crimes, a ‘take’ includes acts (or
omissions) that indirectly or accidentally kill migratory birds.”200
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Second Circuit and Tenth Circuit confused the requirements of mens rea with those of the actus
reus.201 In its holding, the Fifth Circuit court explained that “requiring defendants, as an element of an MBTA misdemeanor
crime, to take an affirmative action to cause migratory bird deaths is
consistent with the imposition of strict liability.”202 As a result of its
review of case law, the Fifth Circuit’s holding was consistent with
common law precedent and fundamental principles of statutory
interpretation.203
VI. IMPACT
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in CITGO Petroleum Corp. increases
the division among federal appeals courts when interpreting “takings” in the MBTA.204 Because the MBTA employs the common
law definition of “take,” which excludes negligent and uninten196. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 493 (explaining district court’s adoption of Tenth Circuit’s position).
197. See id. at 489 (agreeing with Eighth and Ninth Circuits).
198. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 146-157 and accompanying text.
199. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 492 (taking contrary approach to Second and Tenth Circuits).
200. Id. (explaining disagreement with Second and Tenth Circuits).
201. Id. (stating basis for disagreement).
202. Id. (quoting United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 2002))
(requiring affirmative action for MBTA liability).
203. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and findings, see supra
notes 98-173 and accompanying text.
204. For a further discussion of the current circuit split, see supra notes 146157 and accompanying text.
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tional acts, the court reversed the convictions.205 The Fifth Circuit
became the fifth federal appeals court to weigh in on the debate,
joining the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in opposing the Second’s and
Tenth Circuit’s strict liability interpretation.206 This circuit split
makes it increasingly likely that the United States Supreme Court
will address the interpretation of “takings.”207
The court’s resolution of imposing strict liability on “takings” is
viewed as overreaching.208 Commentators who are against punishing unintentional acts note that prosecutorial discretion is the only
barrier to punishment for MBTA “takings” violations; these unprotected violations could include children hitting baseballs that strike
birds, car drivers colliding with birds, individuals owning large windows that birds fly into, or even cat owners whose animals act on
their natural instincts.209 The Fifth Circuit’s holding limited this
overbroad understanding and decreased the MBTA risk of punishment for unintentional bird deaths.210
The softened stance on “takings” makes challenges to convictions in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, likely and will cause those
states to become significantly more attractive to industrial manufacturing.211 Industrial manufacturers will be more likely to conduct
business in those states, as compared to states, such as Colorado,
Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming, in which the
Tenth Circuit imposes strict liability.212 The issue of liability for unintentional actions has not been addressed in eight circuits.213 In
effect, the circuits have created a “regional schism” that the United
States Supreme Court or congressional action must resolve.214
While the Fifth Circuit reached a “clean, logical, and historically
accurate resolution” to MBTA “takings,” this holding will have to
205. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 492 (holding MBTA adopts common law definition of “take”).
206. For a further discussion of the current circuit split, see supra notes 146157 and accompanying text.
207. See Obrecht, supra note 195 (explaining ripeness for review by United
States Supreme Court).
208. For a further discussion of the strict liability consequences, see supra
notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
209. Carusello, supra note 36 (discussing prosecutorial discretion as limiting
force).
210. See Obrecht, supra note 195 (describing impact on industries).
211. Id. (describing impact on industries).
212. Id. (elaborating on likelihood businesses will be attracted to non-strict
liability states).
213. See id. (explaining liability question remains unresolved in many
circuits).
214. Id. (stating only available options to resolve circuit split).
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face challenges both in the Fifth Circuit and other jurisdictions; ultimately, the United States Supreme Court will need to address this,
as environmental and animal protection special interest groups
continue to fight for stricter enforcement.215
Christopher C. Wilcoxson*
215. See Obrecht, supra note 195 (discussing impact of victory for industry in
CITGO).
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law,
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